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Home Office Deductions: May a Taxpayer Have More Than 
One Principal Place of Business? 
Section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code I establishes the con-
ditions under which taxpayers may deduct expenses incurred to 
maintain offices in their homes. Congress enacted this provision to 
enable taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the courts 
to distinguish objectively between deductible business expenses and 
nondeductible personal living expenses, and to limit excessive de-
ductions. 2 The section furthers these goals by generally prohibiting 
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, § 601, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 280A). Section 280A provides in part: 
(a) GENERAL RULE. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of a 
taxpayer who is an individual or an electing small business corporation, no deduction 
otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwell-
ing unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence. 
(b) EXCEPTION FOR INTEREST, TAXES, CASUALTY LOSSES, ETC. - Subsection (a) 
shall not apply to any deduction allowable to the taxpayer without regard to its connec-
tion with his trade or business (or with his income-producing activity). 
(c) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN BUSINESS OR RENTAL UsE; LIMITATION ON DEDUC-
TIONS FOR SUCH USE. -
(I) CERTAIN BUSINESS USE. - Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the 
extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used 
on a regular basis -
(A) as the taxpayer's principal place of business, 
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting 
or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business, or 
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in 
connection with the taxpayer's trade or business. 
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use 
referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his employer. 
(5) LIMITATION ON DEDUCTIONS. -In the case ofa use described in paragraph (I) 
. . . the deductions allowed under this chapter for the taxable year by reason of being 
attributed to such use shall not exceed the excess of -
(A) the gross income derived from such use for the taxable year, over 
(B) the deductions allocable to such use which are allowable under this chapter for 
the taxable year whether or not such unit (or portion thereof) was so used. 
This Note considers only the deduction authorized by§ 280A(c)(l)(A)- the "principal place 
of business" exception. 
2. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, 147, reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3439, 3446, 3579-80 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 
658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 160, reprinted in (1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2987, 
2905, 3053-54. When Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced 
this section on the floor of the Senate, he stated: 
While in theory there is nothing wrong with appropriate deductions for business or invest-
ment expenses, in practice it is often extremely difficult to allocate between deductible 
business expenses and nondeductible personal expenses. The result is that many people 
are deducting excessive amounts, and the bill places strict limits on these deductions. 
122 CONG. REc. 18,542 (1976). 
Expenses incurred in a taxpayer's trade or business or in the production of income are 
generally deductible. I.R.C. §§ 162, 212. However, "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided 
• . . no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." I.R.C. § 262. 
Congress allows taxpayers to deduct certain personal expenses for unexpected occurrences, 
such as casualty losses, I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), and large medical bills, I.R.C. § 213, and for behav-
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deductions for trade or business expenses3 attributable to home of-
fices, 4 and specifying a limited number of exceptions. One of those 
exceptions authorizes home office deductions where the taxpayer 
uses part of his home "exclusively . . . on a regular basis" as his 
"principal place of business."5 
Although the phrase "principal place of business" seems rela-
tively straightforward, it has created interpretative difficulties. The 
IRS defines "principal place of business" as the single location from 
which the taxpayer conducts the bulk of his total business activity, 
regardless of whether he engages in several separate businesses.6 In 
Curphey v. Commissioner ,1 the Tax Court rejected this approach in 
favor of a broader definition. The taxpayer in Curphey managed 
several condominiums in addition to working full time at a hospital 
and deducted expenses attributable to a home office that he used ex-
clusively on a regular basis to manage the condominiums. 8 The IRS 
argued that Curphey could have only one principal place of business 
ior that the legislature wishes to encourage, such as charitable contributions, I.R.C. § 170. 
Congress also permits taxpayers to deduct certain state and local taxes, I.R.C. § 164. For a 
general discussion of this area, see M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 140-53 (2d 
ed. 1979). 
3. Typically, these expenses include an allocable portion of the home depreciation, mainte-
nance, utility, and insurance expenses. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144, [1976) U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3577. 
4. I.R.C. § 280A(a). 
5. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l)(A). 
Section 280A also allows the home office deductions for two other types of offices: a place 
of business normally used by "patients, clients, or customers," or a separate structure not at-
tached to the dwelling unit. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l). In each case, the home office must be "exclu-
sively used on a regular basis" for business purposes. In the case of an employee, the home 
office must be exclusively used "for the convenience of his employer." I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l). 
Congress also limited the amount that a taxpayer could deduct. The taxpayer may deduct the 
amount of gross income generated by the business use of the home less the amount of deduc-
tions otherwise allowed by the Code for the home, such as property taxes, I.R.C. § 164, and 
mortgage interest payments, I.R.C. § 163. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5). For the text of these provi-
sions, see note 1 supra. 
There are circumstances in which a taxpayer may choose not to take the home office deduc-
tion even if his expenses qualify under § 280A. That part of the home to which expenses are 
allocated as a business office does not qualify for nomecognition of gain upon the sale of the 
home. I.R.C. § 1034. Therefore, any gain realized for that portion of the house would have to 
be currently recognized. See generally Priv. Ru!. 7950003, IRS LETTER RuL. (CCH) Book 7, 
Fiche l; Lubell, The Home Office J)eduction: ls it Worth It?, 56 TAXES 528 (1978). Presuma-
bly the same is true for I.R.C. § 121, the one-time exclusion of gain from the sale of a principal 
residence by an individual who has attained age 55. 
6. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 776 (1980); Proposed Treas, Reg. § l.280A-
2(b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980) ("[A] taxpayer may have only one principal place of business regardless 
of the number of business activities in which the taxpayer may be engaged."); Priv. Ru!. 
8048014, [1980) IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Ru!. 8048080, [1980) IRS LETTER 
RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8030025, [1980) IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 31; Priv, Ru!. 
8030024, [1980) IRS LETTER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 31. 
7. 73 T.C. 766 (1980). 
8. 73 T.C. at 767-68. The Tax Court also determined that management of the rental prop-
erty constituted a business under § 280A. 73 T.C. at 775. 
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even if he engaged in more than one business.9 The Service con-
tended that the hospital was Curphey's principal place of business 
because he spent more time and earned a greater portion of his in-
come there. 10 The Tax Court, however, held that section 280A au-
thorizes deductions for a home office that is the principal place of 
any of a taxpayer's businesses. I I Because Curphey's home office was 
the principal place of his rental business, section 280A would not 
prevent him from deducting the expenses incurred to maintain that 
office. The IRS does not acquiesce in the Tax Court's decision, and 
has proposed regulations that adopt the overall business activity in-
terpretation. I2 
This Note argues that the Tax Court's more liberal interpretation 
is correct because it more nearly reflects Congress's intent. Part I 
seeks a basis for preferring one of the competing interpretations in 
the text of section 280A and in the section's legislative history, but 
finds none. Looking, of necessity, to the purposes that Congress 
sought to advance with section 280A, Part II argues that those pur-
poses do not demand a restrictive reading of "principal place of busi-
ness." Such a reading, moreover, would undermine fundamental 
and longstanding congressional tax policies. In the absence of a 
more explicit statement of congressional intent, this policy analysis 
provides a reasonable basis for rejecting the IRS's definition and for 
concluding that home office expenses are deductible if the office in 
question is the principal place of any of the taxpayer's businesses. 
I 
Although Congress excepted home offices that serve as a tax-
payer's "principal place of business" from section 280A's general 
rule of nondeductibility, it did not define this phrase when it enacted 
the section. Because Congress apparently did not consider how this 
provision would apply to taxpayers engaged in more than one busi-
9. 73 T.C. at 775-76. 
10. 73 T.C. at 775-76. 
11. 73 T.C. at 776-77. 
12. Proposed Treas. Reg.§ l.280A-2(b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980). 
After these proposed regulations were announced, Congress forbade the IRS from using 
public funds to enforce regulations that determine the taxpayer's principal place of business 
under§ 280A. Appropriation - Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-369, § 123, 94 Stat. 1351 
(1980). Senator William L. Armstrong has since proposed S.31, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 
which, in part, would clarify § 280A by explicitly allowing a deduction, subject to certain limi-
tations, for the expenses incurred by a taxpayer in maintaining a home office which is the 
principle place of any business, including a secondary business. In a letter to Senator Arm-
strong dated July 13, 1981, the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy indicated that this amend-
ment was unnecessary since the Treasury now intends to propose new regulations providing 
for such a result See [1981) 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) f 55,421, at 55,236. At this writing, new 
proposed regulations have not been issued. 
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ness, 13 the statutory language does not indicate whether section 280A 
refers to the principal place of all of a taxpayer's business activity or 
to the principal place of any specific business.14 Despite section 
280A's lack of clarity on this point, the IRS argues that the statute's 
language favors its approach. Specifically, the Service points out 
that Congress authorized deductions for expenses incurred in main-
taining a principal place of business rather than principal places .15 
But "words importing the singular include and apply to several per-
sons, parties, or things" in all acts of Congress, unless the context 
otherwise requires. 16 The IRS argues further that because Congress 
authorized deductions for three types of home offices,17 it is an "ob-
vious conclusion" that if the office is not the taxpayer's "principal 
place of business," a deduction is allowable only if one of the other 
provisions applies. 18 This argument, however, is at least as circular 
as it is obvious. Both its premise and its conclusion assume that a 
taxpayer may apply the exception only once, and the mere presence 
of other exceptions does not justify that assumption. 
The definitional problem is compounded by the fact that Con-
gress has not used the phrase "principal place of business" in any 
other section of the Code in a way that elucidates the meaning of 
section 280A. Lacking explicit textual support for its position, the 
13. The issue was raised in a letter to Congress, but apparently not acted upon. The writer 
stated: 
Let me also raise a third point which I believe should be clarified in the committee 
report. Section 280(c)(l)(a) (sic) applies to the taxpayer's "principal place of business." It 
is my assumption that this relates to the business whose income is being taxed and not to 
the major source of income of the individual. 
Tax Reform Act of 197.5: Hearings on R.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3220 (1976) (letter from Roy Slade, director, Corcoran Gallery of Art). 
Congress debated the Tax Reform Act on the following dates: Dec. 3 & 4, 1975, (consid-
ered in and passed by the House); June 16-18, 21-25, 28-30, July 1, 20-23, 26-30, Aug. 3-6, 1976 
(House and Senate agreed to conference report that resolved amendments in disagreement). 
See 121 CONG. REc. 35,458 (1975); 122 CONG. REc. 17,454 (1976). 
14. See I.R.C. § 280A. Other sections of the Code that use the phrase "principal place of 
business" refer to the headquarters or main office of a single corporation or tax preparation 
business. See I.R.C. § 819A(b) (contiguous country branches of domestic life insurance com-
panies); I.R.C. § 5113(b) (exemption of sales by liquor stores operated by states, political sub-
divisions, etc.); I.R.C. § 6038(a) (information with respect to certain foreign corporations); 
I.R.C. § 609l(b) (place for filing returns or other documents); I.R.C. § 7407(a), (c) (action to 
enjoin income tax preparers); I.R.C. § 7482(b) (courts of review; venue). 
IS. See Priv. Rul. 8048080, (1980) IRS LE'ITER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8048014, 
[1980) IRS LETIER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8030025, (1980) IRS LE'ITER RUL. (CCH) 
Fiche 31; Priv. Rul. 8030024, (1980) IRS LETIER RuL. (CCH) Fiche 31. 
16. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (cross referenced from I.R.C. § 770l(d)(l)(/)). C:f. Treas. Reg. 
§ l.368-2(h) (1960) ("As used in section 368, as well as in other provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code, if the context so requires . . . the singular includes the plural."). 
17. See note 1 supra. 
18. Brief for Respondent at 14-15, Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). Priv. 
Rul. 8048080, [1980) IRS LETIER RuL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8048014, (1980) IRS LET-
TER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 50; Priv. Rul. 8030025, (1980) IRS LE'ITER RuL. (CCH) Fiche 31; Priv. 
Rul. 8030024, (1980] IRS LETIER RUL. (CCH) Fiche 31. 
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IRS has relied by analogy on decisions interpreting section 
162(a)(2),19 which authorizes the deduction of "ordinary and neces-
sary . . . traveling expenses . . . [incurred] while away from home in 
the pursuit of a trade or business."20 The Service invokes this anal-
ogy because, for the purposes of section 162, a taxpayer's home "is 
[usually] considered to be located at his principal or regular place of 
business or employment."21 The IRS argues that the criteria used to 
determine a taxpayer's tax home under section 162 should also be 
used to designate his "principal place of business" under section 
28OA.22 Implicit in these criteria is an assumption that a taxpayer 
may have only one principal place of business and, therefore, only 
one tax home,23 regardless of how many businesses he has.24 
There are several reasons why courts should not rely on cases 
interpreting section 162(a)(2) to interpret section 28OA's "principal 
place of business" requirement. First, the tax ''home" relevant to 
section 162 includes the entire city or general area in which a busi-
ness is located,25 while a taxpayer's "principal place of business" 
under section 28OA is related to a specific situs or building.26 Sec-
ond, these sections address different types of tax problems. Congress 
adopted section 162(a)(2) to aid taxpayers whose businesses require 
that they travel to another city and incur additional living ex-
penses.27 Although these expenses generally would be classified as 
19. 73 T.C. at 776. 
20. I.R.C. § 162(a), 162(a)(2). Travel expenses generally include transportation expenses, 
meals, and lodging. 
21. Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 C.B. 54, 54. See Coombs v. Commissioner, 608 F.2d 1269, 
1274 (9th Cir. 1979); Frank v. United States, 577 F.2d 93, 97 (9th Cir. 1978); Markey v. Com-
missioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1253 (6th Cir. 1974); Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 195 (1979), 
revd., 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980). But see Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Burns v. Gray, 287 F.2d 698, 700 (6th Cir. 1961). 
22. See Brief for Respondent at 11-14, Curphey v. Com.missioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). The 
factors used to determine which area is the taxpayer's home under§ 162(a)(2) are (I) the total 
time ordinarily spent in performing duties in each area; (2) the degree of the individual's 
activity in each area, and (3) the relative significance of his financial return from each area. 
See Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249, 1252 (6th Cir. 1974); IRS Publication No. 17 at 
67, 1 IRS PUBLICATIONS (CCH) 501, 569 (1980). 
23. See Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir. 1978); Curphey v. Com.mis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980); Montgomery v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 175 (1975), affd., 532 F.2d 
1088 (6th Cir. 1976); Sherman v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 332 (1951). 
24. See generally Benson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1555, 1557 (1968); Dorsky v. 
Patterson, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9135, at 71,189 (D. Alaska 1958); Stairwalt v. Com.mis-
sioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 902, 903 (1952); Sherman v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 332, 337 (1951). 
25. See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 776; IRS, DEPT OF THE TREAS., PUB. No. 
463, TRAVEL, ENTERTAINMENT AND GIFT EXPENSES 2 (1980). 
26. The taxpayer's home office is in his place of residence - a particular building. The 
Curphey court rejected the application of the § 162(a)(2) criteria for this reason. 73 T.C. at 
776. 
27. See Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 195; Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 562 
(1968); Benson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1555, 1557 (1968). 
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nondeductible personal expenses,28 Congress concluded that dupli-
cative costs incurred to further a business should be deductible.29 
Section 280A, on the other hand, represents an attempt to distinguish 
between business and personal expenses to prevent taxpayers from 
deducting personal expenditures.30 Home office expenses are de-
ductible because of their inherent business nature, rather than be-
cause these expenses duplicate costs otherwise incurred by the 
taxpayer. The IRS's single principal place of business requirement 
may be justified under section 162(a)(2) as a reasonable means to 
determine whether the taxpayer has incurred duplicative expenses. 
But section 280A has no duplication requirement, and the analogy 
relied on by the IRS is, therefore, inapposite. 
Part I thus finds no basis in section 280A's language, in explicit 
congressional statements, or in analogies to other Code sections for 
preferring either the IRS's "total business" interpretation or the Tax 
Court's more liberal one. Part II looks for other evidence that may 
illuminate Congress's intent. 
II 
To choose between the alternative constructions of "principal 
place of business,'' courts should examine how each interpretation 
comports with the purposes of section 280A, and adopt the one that 
best satisfies congressional intent.31 Congress enacted section 280A 
to "curb the widespread abuses"32 associated with home office de-
ductions - to prevent taxpayers from deducting predominantly per-
sonal expenses under the guise of business expenses. 33 Although this 
purpose would favor a restrictive reading of section 280A's excep-
tions, another fundamental tax policy - authorizing the deduction 
of legitimate business expenses - also underlies the section. It is, 
therefore, essential that courts strike a balance between these com-
peting policies. Part II argues that only the Tax Court's interpreta-
tion guarantees the deductibility oflegitimate business expenses, and 
that it does so without reducing the effectiveness of Congress's statu-
tory abuse-prevention scheme. 
Before Congress adopted section 280A, a taxpayer could deduct 
the costs of maintaining an office in his home under either of the 
28. See I.R.C. § 262; Treas. Reg. § I.262-l(b)(5) (1958) (household expenses are nonde-
ductible); Treas. Reg.§ I.262-l(b)(5) (1958) (traveling expenses nondeductible unless specifi-
cally authorized). 
29. James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206-08 (9th Cir. 1962). 
30. See text at note 2 supra. 
31. See Stanley v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 434,439 (9th Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. Kel-
ley, 293 F.2d 904, 912 (5th Cir. 1961). 
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, (1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3440. 
33. See note 42 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
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general business expense deduction provisions: section 162, which 
allows "as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid 
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness,"34 or section 212, which permits taxpayers to deduct the "ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable 
year ... for the production or collection of income."35 However, 
the IRS and the courts did not always use the same standard to de-
termine whether home office expenses were "ordinary and neces-
sary."36 The Service challenged the deduction of expenses 
associated with employees' home offices that were not required by 
the employer as a "a condition of employment."37 Some courts used 
a more liberal and subjective standard, requiring only that the office 
be "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business.38 Under 
this standard, courts allowed deductions to a teacher who used a por-
tion of his home to prepare for class, 39 and to a television advertising 
executive who used his den exclusively to review his day's work and 
to view television ads and programs.40 Congress decided to elimi-
nate the home office deduction in such situations because it felt that 
the office was primarily a personal convenience rather than a neces-
sary element of the taxpayer's trade or business.41 The Senate Com-
34. I.R.C. § 162(a). See, e.g., Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). 
35. I.R.C. § 212. In adopting § 280A, Congress eliminl).ted the home office deduction for 
§ 212 activities. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 149, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS at 3581. 
36. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144-45, 147, [1976) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS at 3577, 3579, and cases cited therein. 
31. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 
3577. The IRS has consistently argued that an employee-taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for 
home office expenses only when that office is a condition of employment. See Bodzin v. Com-
missioner, 60 T.C. 820, 824-25 (1973), revd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 
(1975); Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304, 314 (1973), revd, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); O'Connell v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 837, 842 (1972); 
Dietrich v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 686 (1971); Rev. Rul 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52, 
52-53. 
38. E.g., Hall v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 612, 616 (D.N.H. 1975); Gillis v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 429, 432 (1973); Johnson v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 941, 
943 (1972); Rafferty v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 848, 850 (1971); Bischoffv. Commis-
sioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 538, 539 (1966). Other courts permitted these expenses to be de-
ducted only when the home office was an implied condition of employment. This type of 
situation arose when the taxpayer's office was either inadequate, see Peiss v. Commissioner, 40 
T.C. 78, 83-84 (1963); Dietrich v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 687 (1971), or not 
available after working hours, see Kirby v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 431, 432-33 
(1980). 
39. E.g., Hall v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 612 (D.N.H. 1975); Dietrich v. Commissioner, 
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 685 (1971); Peiss v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 78 (1963). 
40. Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969), q(fd., 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 
1970). 
41. See SENATE REPORT supra note 2, at 3, 9-10, 147-48, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS at 3440, 3446, 3579-80. 
Some courts had previously disallowed deductions for home office expenses that seemed to 
be primarily personal in nature. E.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 523 (1976), q(fd 
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mittee Report indicates that Congress wished to prevent situations in 
which "expenses otherwise considered nondeductible personal, liv-
ing, and family expenses might be converted into deductible business 
expenses simply because, under the facts of the particular case, it was 
appropriate and helpful to perform some portion of the taxpayer's 
business in his personal residence."42 
Congress sought to ensure the discreteness of personal and busi-
ness expenses by replacing the subjective test used by courts inter-
preting section 162(a)43 with more objective and limiting 
standards.44 To objectify the analysis further, the IRS has proposed 
regulations that establish the criteria by which it wishes to determine 
a taxpayer's overall principal place of business. The Service intends 
to consider: 
(i) the portion of the total income from business activities which is 
attributable to activities at each location; 
(ii) the amount of time spent in business activities in each location; 
and 
(iii) the facilities available to the taxpayer at each location.45 
These objective factors would provide courts with greater guidance 
in determining the deductibility of home office expenses than does 
the amorphous "appropriate and helpful" standard that some courts 
have employed.46 But courts can apply these criteria to each of the 
taxpayer's specific businesses as easily as to his overall business ac-
tivity. The court could examine the taxpayer's businesses separately 
and determine the principal location of each. Thus, the factors pro-
posed by the IRS provide the same degree of objectivity whether the 
court applies the Service's single principal place of business standard 
per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Meehan v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C. 794, 808 (1976); Shepherd v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 219, 224 
(1976); O'Connell v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 837, 843 (1972). 
42. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 147, (1976] U.S. CODE CONO. & An. NEWS at 3580. 
The Committee Report indicates that Congress was particularly concerned about employ-
ees who had an office supplied by their employer, but did some work at home because it was 
more convenient. See id The Report cites Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 
(1969), '!!fd., 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), as an example of the sort of deduction that § 280A 
was intended to disallow. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 145, (1976] U.S. CODE CONO, & 
AD. NEWS at 3577. In that case, the taxpayer, a television network employee, worked during 
the day in an office supplied by the network, and used a home office during the evenings to 
review his day's work, view ads, and perform other tasks related to his job at the network. His 
office at the network was always available to him, and he was not required to do any work at 
home. See 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 688. Congress concluded that, in such cases, the taxpayer 
worked at home only for his personal convenience and should not be entitled to a deduction. 
43. Prior to the adoption of § 280A, several courts determined the deductibility of home 
office expenses by using an "appropriate and helpful" standard. See notes 38-42 supra and 
accompanying text. 
44. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 147, (1976] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS at 
3579. The Report indicates that the Committee believed there was "a great need for definitive 
rules" in the area of home office deductions. Id 
45. Proposed Treas. Reg.§ I.280A-2{b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980). 
46. See note 38 supra. 
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or the more liberal standard announced by the Cuphey court. Since 
both standards are equally objective, courts cannot select an inter-
pretation of "principal place of business" on the basis of this factor. 47 
Congress, however, sought not only an objective standard, but 
also one that objectively prohibited the deduction of personal ex-
penses. A standard may provide objective guidelines, yet neverthe-
less be inconsistent with Congress's intent, if it routinely allows 
taxpayers to deduct personal expenses. Neither the IRS's interpreta-
tion of "principal place of business" nor that of the Cup hey court is 
subject to this criticism. 
Three requirements - principal place of business, exclusivity, 
and regular use - together provide a sufficient guarantee that the 
taxpayer has incurred expenses for a business purpose. In addition 
to the "principal place of business" requirement, section 280A man-
dates that the home office be "exclusively used on a regular basis" 
for business purposes.48 This means that the taxpayer must prove 
that a specific part of his home is used "solely for the purpose of 
carrying on his trade or business."49 Although the office need not be 
47. In fact, on close examination the three factors proposed by the IRS appear better suited 
to determining which office of a single business is its principal place of business than to decid-
ing which of a taxpayer's businesses is his principal business. The Curphey court's interpreta-
tion avoids the need to make the very difficult and frequently subjective latter determination. 
In this sense, the Tax Court's reading of "principal place of business" may provide greater 
objectivity than the IRS's. 
48. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l). 
49. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 148, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3581. 
The "exclusive use" requirement does not apply to all of the provisions of§ 280A If the 
taxpayer's home is the sole fixed location of his sales business, the inventory storage space need 
not be exclusively used for business purposes. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(2); SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 149, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3582. Exclusive use is also not re-
quired for a deduction if a taxpayer is providing day care services in the home. I.R.C. 
§ 280A(c)(4). Congress added this exception in 1978 because such activity cannot realistically 
be limited to one portion of the home yet "ordinarily result[s] in ... incremental expenses 
attributable to the residence beyond those which [would] have been incurred if the residence 
had been used solely for personal purposes." S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, reprinted 
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 185, 267. 
A literal reading of the word "exclusively" may also create difficulties. If "exclusively" is 
interpreted to mean exclusively as the principal place of the particular business, it would bar 
deductions that should be allowed. For example, if a taxpayer had two businesses, each with 
its only office in the same room in the taxpayer's home, he should clearly get a deduction for 
home office expenses. However, the office would not be used exclusively as the principal place 
of either business. Under the IRS's interpretation, the taxpayer would get a deduction because 
the office would be his overall principal place of business, and used exclusively as such. A 
similar situation would arise if the home office was the principal place of one of the taxpayer's 
businesses, but was also used as a secondary location for a second business that had its princi-
pal place of business located elsewhere. Under this Note's analysis, the taxpayer should get a 
deduc,tion because it is the principal place of one of the taxpayer's businesses. The taxpayer 
should not lose the deduction merely because he does some other business work in the office. 
And if the business with its principal office in the taxpayer's home is his primary business, he 
would be allowed a deduction under the IRS's interpretation as well. 
Under both the IRS's and the Curphey court's interpretations, the taxpayer should get a 
deduction in these situations because he has incurred legitimate business expenses. But there 
may nevertheless be some question as to whether the Curphey court's separate business inter-
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in a separate room, it must be physically segregated from space used 
for personal purposes50 to eliminate the administrative problem of 
verifying the taxpayer's allocation of expenses attributable to the 
various uses.51 Congress imposed the "regular use" requirement to 
ensure that the taxpayer actually worked in the home office, and to 
prohibit deductions for a room that is used to conduct business only 
"incidental[ly] or occasional[ly]."52 Under either interpretation of 
"principal place of business," the bulk of the taxpayer's work and 
income, at least for one business, must be generated through the 
home office.53 Although the Curphey court's "specific business" in-
terpretation permits a deduction for home offices that may generate 
a smaller percentage of the taxpayer's total income, the business na-
ture of the office itself remains unchanged. The office must be the 
headquarters for activities that qualify as a "trade or business" even 
under this more liberal interpretation of "principal place of busi-
ness."54 The limitations that Congress built into section 280A are 
thus sufficient to ensure that taxpayers may deduct only business ex-
penses, regardless of whether "principal place of business" is read 
expansively or narrowly. 
This conclusion is reflected in the Tax Court's decision in 
Curphey. Dr. Curphey claimed a deduction for a home office that 
pretation would authorize these deductions. All doubt could be removed by interpreting "ex-
clusively'' to mean exclusively for a business purpose. This would ensure that the expenses 
incurred to maintain the home office in the situations described above would be deductible. It 
is also consistent with Congress's goals as described in the Committee Reports, which empha-
sized Congress's reluctance to allow personal expenses to be transformed into business ex-
penses. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
50. See Gomez v. Commissioner, [1981) 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) ~ 57,543 (T.C.M. Dec, 18, 
1980). 
51. This allocation involved several approximations and was not always calculated consist-
ently. For example, some courts allocated expenses based on the ratio of time used for busi-
ness purposes over total time used, while the IRS compared the business use to the total time 
that the room was available for any use. Compare Gino v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304, 314 
(1973), with Rev. RuL 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52, 54. Courts must also calculate the amount of 
space in the home used for business purposes. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 146-47, 
[1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3579. 
52. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 148, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3581. 
One court has stated in dictum that "intermittent" use does not meet the "regular basis" test. 
Borom v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 80,459, at 1997-98 (1980) (dictum). 
53. The criteria evolved by the IRS for determining a taxpayer's principal place of business 
require a determination of ''the amount of time spent in business activities" and "the portion 
of the total income from business activities" generated at each of the taxpayer's business loca-
tions. Proposed Treas. Reg.§ l.280A-2(b)(2) (Aug. 7, 1980). This test can be used to deter-
mine the principal place of either a specific business or the taxpayer's total business activity. 
54. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 149, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 
3581. 
For activity to qualify as a trade or business under I.R.C. § 162, it must consist of more 
than isolated transactions; courts require continuing, regularized activity, though it need not be 
the taxpayer's primacy business. See, e.g., Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607, 610 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941); Atkins v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 288, 290..91 (Ct, Cl. 
1936). 
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was the principal place of his rental business. The rental business, 
however, was a secondary business for Curphey, since it produced 
less income and required less time than his medical career, which 
was located principally at a nearby hospital.55 Nevertheless, the Tax 
Court allowed Curphey a deduction for his home office expenses. 56 
It first established that, absent the home office question, expenses at-
tributable to a secondary business are deductible as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. 57 The court found no indication that 
Congress intended to distinguish between primary and secondary 
businesses when it enacted section 280A, and decided that the sec-
tion was less restrictive of legitimate business expense deductions 
than the IRS's overall principal place of business test.58 According 
to the court, its more liberal interpretation of section 280A would 
"fulfill the legislative objective of preventing deductions for the use 
of a home for reasons which are primarily personal" without exclud-
ing any otherwise legitimate home office deductions. 59 The court 
therefore held that a taxpayer can deduct the expenses incurred in 
maintaining a home office as the principal place of his second busi-
ness. 
Because Congress's desire for an objective standard that prohib-
its the deduction of purely personal expenses provides no clear basis 
for choosing between the alternative interpretations, we must tum to 
the second major policy goal - ensuring the deductibility of legiti-
mate business expenses. Congress does not allow individuals to de-
duct personal expenses60 because these expenditures reflect the 
disposition that taxpayers elect to make of the net income that they 
have previously eamed.61 Business expenditures, on the other hand, 
must be deducted to calculate the taxpayer's net income62 - total 
earnings less the expenses and losses incurred in producing those 
55. 73 T.C. 766, 767-68 (1980). 
56. 73 T.C. at 776. 
57. 73 T.C. at 775-76. 
58. 73 T.C. at 776-77. 
59. 73 T.C. at 776-77. 
60. See I.RC. § 262. 
61. See James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted) ("[The 
Internal Revenue Code] reflects a purpose to tax income spent by individuals for their ordi-
nary costs of living."); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 86-87, 140. See generally Andrews, 
.Personal .Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 313 (1972); Kelman, 
.Personal .Deductions Revisited· Wlzy They Fit .Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Wlzy They 
Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 833 (1979); Pechman, Comprehen-
sive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARv. L. REv. 63, 64 (1967); Warren, Would a Con-
sumption Tax Be Fairer Titan an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1083-84 (1980). 
62. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1965); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 
356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1944) (Black, J., dis-
senting); w. ANDERSON, TAXATION AND THE AMERICAN EcONOMY 196 (1951). 
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earnings. 63 Congress taxes net, rather than gross, income because it 
has concluded that net income is a better measure of an individual's 
ability to pay taxes.64 Business expense deductions may also stimu-
late business growth and increase employment opportunities.65 Be-
cause an individual pays no tax on his business expenses, he has 
more capital available to reinvest in his business or to spend on con-
sumer goods. This additional capital may produce greater business 
income, which in tum generates additional tax revenues. 66 
It is on this ground that courts can distinguish between the IRS's 
"overall business" and the Tax Court's "specific business" interpre-
tations of "principal place of business." Since the deductions al-
lowed under either construction are legitimate business expenses, 
and not personal expenses,67 Congress's intent is best satisfied by the 
standard that allows the greater number of legitimate business ex-
penses to be deducted. By interpreting section 280A liberally, courts 
will further Congress's desire to tax only net income, to stimulate 
economic growth, and to increase employment opportunities.68 The 
IRS, which allows taxpayers to deduct the office expenses associated 
with a second business not located in the home, 69 refuses to allow a 
taxpayer to deduct the expenses of maintaining a room in his home 
as the principal office of his second business. 70 This policy makes an 
entire class of business expenses nondeductible, and frustrates con-
gressional intent. The Curphey court's analysis, on the other hand, 
allows this group of business expenses to be deducted. Because the 
Curphey court's approach permits a greater number of legitimate 
business expenses to be deducted without contravening section 
280A's other goals, courts and the IRS should adopt its conclusion 
that section 280A authorizes deductions for expenses incurred to 
63. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958); Higgins v. 
Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940). 
64. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 86; W. GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
MODERN TAXATION 71-72 (2d ed. 1938). q: w. ANDERSON, supra note 62, at 316 (discussing 
state gross income taxes on businesses). 
65. See W. ANDERSON,supra note 62, at 311, 510-11; THE COMMITTEE ON POSTWAR TAX 
POLICY, A TAX PROGRAM FOR A SOLVENT AMERICA 16, 58, 82 (1945); W. RABY, THE INCOME 
TAX AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 42 (1964); THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE 
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TAXES AND THE BUDGET 11, 13 (1947); THE RE-
SEARCH COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A POSTWAR FED-
ERAL TAX PLAN FOR HIGH EMPLOYMENT 7 (1944); Carpenter, Growth and Federal Income 
Taxes, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 94, 99, 112-13 (1962). 
66. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 25, (1962) U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
3304, 3304, 3327. 
61. See notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text. 
68. See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d.509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1943), Curphey v. 
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 776 (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6 (1960). 
70. See note 6 supra. 
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maintain home offices that are the principal place of any of the tax-
payer's businesses. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 280A limits the availability of home office deductions. 
Congress now permits taxpayers to deduct these expenses in only a 
few specified cases, such as when the home office is the taxpayer's 
"principal place of business." In the case of a taxpayer with more 
than one business, the IRS has interpreted this provision to allow a 
deduction only when the home office is the principal place of the 
taxpayer's overall business activity. But the Tax Court recently held 
that the deduction was available for the principal place of any of the 
taxpayer's businesses. 
This Note advocates the Tax Court's approach, and has demon-
strated that this interpretation better satisfies the congressional poli-
cies that underlie section 280A - allowing taxpayers to deduct 
legitimate business expenses and prohibiting the deduction of per-
sonal expenses. The IRS and the courts should adopt this interpreta-
tion because it allows taxpayers to deduct more of the costs 
associated with maintaining business offices, while providing ade-
quate guarantees that the personal expenses of maintaining a home 
will not be deducted under the guise of business expenses. 
